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Abstract
Background: The origin and stability of cooperation is a hot topic in social and behavioural sciences.
A complicated conundrum exists as defectors have an advantage over cooperators, whenever cooperation is costly
so consequently, not cooperating pays off. In addition, the discovery that humans and some animal populations,
such as lions, are polymorphic, where cooperators and defectors stably live together – while defectors are not
being punished–, is even more puzzling. Here we offer a novel explanation based on a Threshold Public Good
Game (PGG) that includes the interaction of individual and group level selection, where individuals can contribute
to multiple collective actions, in our model group hunting and group defense.
Results: Our results show that there are polymorphic equilibria in Threshold PGGs; that multi-level selection does
not select for the most cooperators per group but selects those close to the optimum number of cooperators (in
terms of the Threshold PGG). In particular for medium cost values division of labour evolves within the group with
regard to the two types of cooperative actions (hunting vs. defense). Moreover we show evidence that spatial
population structure promotes cooperation in multiple PGGs. We also demonstrate that these results apply for a
wide range of non-linear benefit function types.
Conclusions: We demonstrate that cooperation can be stable in Threshold PGG, even when the proportion of so
called free riders is high in the population. A fundamentally new mechanism is proposed how laggards, individuals
that have a high tendency to defect during one specific group action can actually contribute to the fitness of the
group, by playing part in an optimal resource allocation in Threshold Public Good Games. In general, our results
show that acknowledging a multilevel selection process will open up novel explanations for collective actions.
Background
The intriguing phenomenon of cooperation has fasci-
nated experimental and theoretical researchers for dec-
ades, as it is essential for understanding the complexity
of life, and life itself [1-5]. A dilemma derives from the
fact that selfish individuals have an advantage over those
who act cooperatively, by which we mean a costly act
that can benefit others [1,6,7]. Although selfish ‘defec-
tors’ interacting with their own kind have a lower ‘pay-
off’ than cooperators, defectors would eventually totally
replace cooperators in the population [8]. However a
wide variety cooperative behaviour can be observed in
nature [7,9]. Moreover, it is a common observation that
humans [10-12] and some animal populations such as
lions (Panthera leo) [13,14] are polymorphic. Individuals
t h a th a v eah i g ht e n d e n c yt o cooperate live together
with those that have a high tendency to defect. The pro-
portion of these ‘laggards’ can be high in certain socie-
ties and they are not being punished, as in the case of
lions [14] or in a number of human hunter-gatherer
societies [11,15]. Observations suggest that the average
tendency for cooperation in these populations appears
to be stable in the long term. This is a perplexing set of
observations, not yet fully understood. Existing explana-
tions rely either on the snowdrift game [16,17] with
homogeneous population structure, punishment [18], or
spatially explicit population structure [19]. None of
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example lion and human populations are neither com-
pletely well-mixed, nor spatially explicit in a sense as
sedentary organisms, and punishment is also not com-
mon in these instances.
Majority of the current evolutionary game theoretical
studies that shed light on the mechanism behind many
cooperative phenomena in biological systems concen-
trated on pair-wise interactions between individuals
[3,6-8,10,16,20][but see for e.g. [21]]. Arguably numer-
ous examples of group interactions found in nature
however can be described as n-person games [22-25,21],
in which more than two ‘players’ interact with each
other at the same time in the form of group actions
[26-30]. During group interactions individuals typically
invest into common goods or common goals [31]. In
most of the cases this is available for everyone, that is
the common good is non-monopolizable (or non-
excludable, non-exclusive) and non-rival (synonym of
joint in supply, non-diminishable) [32-35]. This raises a
collective action problem, where non cooperators, often
termed as free riders, can reap the benefit of the com-
mon good without investing into it [24,34,35].
In many cases of a collective action the achieving the
group goal, for example capturing prey depends on the
number of encircling hunters [36,37], and not necessa-
rily on their individual efforts (Figure 1). During numer-
ous instances of cooperative hunting several individuals
simply fill the position of blocking, diverting, flushing
the prey. This threshold effect is documented for coop-
erative hunting situations in various social carnivores
including lions [36,37], African wild dogs (Lycaon pic-
tus) [38-40], chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) [41], Harris’
Hawks (Parabuteo inicintus) [42] and humans [43,44].
For example when lions are hunting small prey, each
lion pursues its own animal. However with larger, faster
or more difficult prey [45] the cooperation of a group of
hunters is needed to encircle, split the herd, to spot,
surround and kill the animal [36,37,46]. In order to
make the hunt successful several lions have to work
together (about 4-7) [36,37,47,48], get close to the prey
before starting the attack (30-50 m) [36,37,46,49] and
cut off its escape routes by encircling the prey from dif-
ferent points and filling the roles of “centers” and
“wings” [36,37]. Below a threshold group size it is not
only hard to capture the prey but to defend it against
hyenas [50]. Chimpanzees [41,51] or wild dogs [39]
sometimes use similar encircling tactics. Harris’ Hawks
either perform surprise attacks on lagomorphs from dif-
ferent directions, or use flush-and-ambush tactics to
capture hidden prey [42]. Some other bird species also
hunt cooperatively larger prey, such as Brown-necked
Raven (Corvus ruficollis)o nE g y p t i a nM a s t i g u r e( Uro-
mastyx aegyptius), in which case two birds fill the tasks
of blocking the escape routes of the prey while several
others attack it from several directions, always perform-
ing the direct attack on the most exposured part of the
lizard [52]. Many sea mammal species, such as killer
whales (Orcinus orca), humpback whales (Megaptera
novaengliae), bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus)
and spotted dolphins (Stenella frontalis) chase school of
fish into a tight ball, sometimes driving it into a rock or
to the water surface with coordinated group action,
some performing tail slaps, creating a curtain of air
around the fish ball or performing feeding bouts
[27,53-56]. Moreover some whales may use their acous-
tic “trumpets” creating a “wall sound” combined with
the bubble net, as recently suggested by Leighton and
colleagues, to trap the fish inside the curtain [57]. Coop-
erative hunting in human hunter-gatherers societies has
been common, as coordinated action of several hunters
was necessary to chase larger preys into a natural trap
and to hunt them down (consider for example the buf-
falo jump sites) [58,59]. There are numerous examples
of threshold effects in the operation of modern human
societies and in economics [60]. Take as an example the
requirement of a minimum number of hunters on the
boat during traditional whale hunting [44] or the neces-
sity of collective mass for successful employee strikes
[61,62]. Finally, threshold effects in group cooperation
can appear not only in human and animal hunting
societies. There are well documented examples of a
lower group size threshold in some cooperatively breed-
ing species [40,63,64]. Evidence from microbial coopera-
tion suggests, that in some cases a threshold number of
cooperators, that is bacteria which produce extracellular
chemical components, is crucial in producing a public
good [65,66]. Also, at the dawn of life the first protocells
were most probably composed of cooperative elements,
RNA molecules, which could have controlled the meta-
bolism of the protocell acting like enzymes, and the
complete metabolism most probably required the coop-
eration of sufficient number of elements, or at least the
elements of an autocatalytic core [5,67].
Models of Public Good Game nicely capture the main
features all of the above described cooperative phenom-
ena. But the traditionally used linear benefit return func-
tion is insufficient in capturing the threshold effect for
the optimal number of individuals that is necessary to
perform the given group action, as close to the thresh-
old joining one or few more cooperators disproportion-
ally increases the success of the group action [43,68,69].
So instead a nonlinear return paradigm is more appro-
priate [68,70-72], such as in the n-player Threshold
Public Good Game [71]. In this version of the Public
Good Game (PGG) a successful cooperative effort is
achieved only if the number of cooperating individuals
reaches a given threshold, just like in the above
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be evolutionary stable outcome in such games, depend-
ing on the cost of cooperation, and the proportion of
initial cooperative decisions in the population [71].
While these situations assume that groups of indivi-
duals engage in an interaction which may or may not
end in successful cooperation these groups themselves
often compete with each other [35]. For example, in one
of the most studied group behavioural biological systems
lioness form a pack to hunt together yet they are in
direct competition with other lion packs with which
they share common borders [13,14,47,73,74]. The same
holds for all group hunting territorial species from
hyenas through whales, African wild dogs to humans
[75-78].
Here we study the interaction of selection acting on
the level of individuals engaged in a threshold PGG and
selection acting on these groups while competing for
territories. Thus, our model differs from previous mod-
els of TPGGs [71,72] and that of multi-level selection
[77] by explicitly integrating these two components. We
do so first by giving analytical solutions for the evolutio-
narily stable level of cooperation for various group sizes
and threshold levels at first assuming only individual
selection; then by studying the interaction of individual
and group level selection with a series of computer
Figure 1 The schematic representation of the relationships between the different units in the different model scenarios. Lion hunting
groups (A) and human hunters (B) successfully trap large preys by encircling it, that solitary or few individuals would be unable to do so. The
presented model based on these remarks, where individuals are represented by the coloured circles, which indicate their trait composition (a-c).
The individuals’ location in the population can be fixed in the spatially explicit model, or individuals can disperse randomly in the well-mixed
model. The group (big grey circle) is composed of individuals existing at a location of certain size at that moment (grey arrow). Individuals make
their contributions to the group hunting effort (small green arrows), and receive the payoff according to the rules of the game. (a) Individual
competition only. A randomly chosen focal individual (dashed circle) competes either with one of its group mates in the spatially explicit model,
or with a randomly picked individual from the population in the well-mixed model (blue shadings). (b) Individual and group competition.
Individual competition as before, and after the focal group competes with either a neighbouring group or a random group from the population
(green shading). (c) Individual and group competition with voluntary participation in the both of the group actions, such as the cooperative
hunting and the competition between groups for territories. (d) In the last case individuals have two continuous traits which determine their
propensity to participate in the group actions, x for the Public Good Game, and a for the group competition game, both between 0 and 1.
(pictures from: classicafrica.com; gtemporium.wordpress.com).
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basic setups in the computer simulations: (i) individual
selection only (Figure 1.a), (ii) group selection only, (for
comparison), and (iii) the combination of both, in which
case first we assume that (iii/a) all individuals are
obliged to participate in group defense (Figure 1.b), then
we relax this assumption by allowing (iii/b) voluntary
participation (Figure 1.c). Individual selection in our
model allows individuals to compare their success with
other individuals, or compete for resources, while group
selection based on the idea that stronger groups may
outcompete weaker ones by overtaking their territories.
The structure of the game is described in the Methods
section.
Results
Effect of different threshold functions
First we study the effect of the benefit function shape on
the level of cooperation in the population (Figure 2) by
means of IBM simulations (see Methods). For this we
substitute the threshold benefit function with a sigmoid
function (s-shape function), which gives the probability
of achieving the group goal, that is receiving the benefit
for different levels of cooperative effort. A good indicator
of the cooperativeness in the system is the position of the
hysteresis point [71], which above the proportion of
cooperators drops to zero in all cases. Below the hyster-
esis point, we always find a stable level of cooperation,
while if the cost of cooperation moves above the hyster-
esis point the population rapidly evolves to zero coopera-
tiveness. The positions of the hysteresis points for
different threshold values assuming sigmoid functions
(Figure 2.a) don’t change significantly for a wide range of
s parameter (steepness of the benefit function). For high
values of s (1 <s < 100), the hysteresis point appears at
the same cost values (C(x)) for cases T≠N (Figure 2.c), as
with the strict deterministic step-wise function (Figure 2.
b). For T = n, this parameter range is narrow (10 <s), and
a slight change in the steepness of the benefit function
results in major changes in the cooperative equilibrium.
Our results indicate that the dynamics of the system
remains the same for relatively steep sigmoid functions
than for a step-wise function. In the following we will use
the later one in our simulations.
Results for individual level selection
Next we employ the method described in Bach et al.
2006 [71] to find the stable and instable equilibria of the
model for individual selection only (see Figure 1.a;
further details in the Methods). We also run a series of
simulations in our individual based model (IBM) for
comparison with the analytical model (i.e. to “calibrate”
the IBM simulations). The equilibrium level of coopera-
tion depends both on the size of the group (n)a n do n
the threshold level (T) (Figure 3). Figure 3.a depicts the
resulting fixed points of the system for given group size
and for increasing T, from the analytical model (solid
curves for stable and dashed curves for instable fix
points), and from individual based simulations (dots),
which show a close fit. The higher the threshold value
the higher is the ratio of cooperators at a given group
Figure 2 The effect of s parameter on the level of
cooperativeness in the population.( a) The s parameter
determines the steepness, hence the shape of the sigmoid function.
When s approaches ∞, the probabilistic benefit function approaches
to strict deterministic step-wise function, meaning that above the
threshold (T) the public good is always achieved, while below never.
With decreasing s the probability of public good achievement
changes from strict all or nothing to a smoother function. In the
later case there is a non-zero probability of achieving the common
goal even below the threshold, and also above the threshold the
group can fail. (b) The position of the hysteresis point with the use
of strict deterministic step-wise benefit function. (c) The effect of s
(steepness of the sigmoid function) parameter on the location of
the hysteresis point. The hysteresis point indicates the highest cost
value for which cooperation is still a stable outcome of the game,
and even a small increase in the cost would cause the collapse of
this polymorphic equilibrium to defection. Below this cost value we
always find cooperative equilibria. (●,○:T=5 ;■,□:T=4 ;♦,◊:T=3 ;
▲, Δ: T = 2).
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cooperation can be achieved when the threshold value
equals the size of the group, and for small group sizes,
the average level of cooperation is higher (Figure 3.b).
The unstable fix points separate the attractors of the
interior stable fixed points of cooperation from the
attractors of zero cooperativeness (Figure 3.a). Above
the separatrix, cooperation prevails, below this bound-
ary, cooperation diminishes. All results from IBM model
show a perfect fit for the predictions of the analytical
model.
Introducing multilevel selection
In the following we explore the individual based model
with well-mixed and spatial population structure. In the
first step, we introduce group level selection to the indi-
vidual based model (see Figure 1.b) keeping the partici-
pation in the group defense compulsory. Figure 4
depicts the cases of only group selection (a,d), and the
combination of group and individual selection when
group defense is compulsory (b,e). The most striking
effect of introducing group level selection is that the
hysteresis effect disappears in all cases. In the well-
mixed case (Figure 4.a) the level of cooperation is
higher than without group selection, however, aside
from the case T = n, the population is still polymorphic.
It means that groups with higher number of coopera-
tors do not necessarily enjoy a competitive advantage.
Groups in general respond in proportional manner to
the threshold value, i.e. they optimize resource alloca-
tion. This can be best seen from the spatially explicit
simulation with only group selection (Figure 4.d) as in
this case the average equilibrium level of cooperation is
exactly the threshold level. This implies that any devia-
tion from the optimal group composition results in a
disadvantage for the group, not only if the number of
defectors is higher, but also if the ratio of cooperators
and defectors differs from the optimal in any ways (i.e.
groups that optimize their allocation this way have
higher fitness than groups that do not, see for further
details in Additional file 1f i g u r e sf r o mS . 3t oS . 4 ) .
Introducing individual level selection decreases the level
of cooperation in the well-mixed case (Figure 4.b vs. 4.
a), however interestingly and somewhat counter intui-
tively it increases the level of cooperation in the spa-
tially explicit case (Figure 4.e vs. 4.d). Equilibrium
populations are still polymorphic aside the case T = n.
Figure 4.c and 4.f depicts the case when participation at
the group competition stage is voluntary. When group
defense is cost-free (C(a) = 0) the level of cooperation
i nt h eP u b l i cG o o d sG a m ei st h es a m ea si nt h ep r e -
vious cases (result not shown). When group defense is
costly (C(a) = 1) then the level of cooperation in the
PGG is lower (Figure 4.c and 4.f) and the hysteresis
effect reappears in the well-mixed case (Figure 4.c), but
not in the spatially explicit model (Figure 4.f). Note,
however, that when cooperation is present the poly-
morphic nature of the equilibria is preserved (aside T =
n in the wellmixed model), that is, resource allocation is
still optimized, groups with higher number of coopera-
tors do not win out by default.
Finally Figure 5 depicts the results as a function of the
two kinds of costs and the initial number of the coop-
e r a t o r si nt h eP G Gw h e nb o t ht h ep a r t i c i p a t i o ni nt h e
hunt and in the group defense is voluntary (see Figure
1.c). We can observe four types of dynamics in our
simulations (Figure 5.a-d). If the costs of cooperation (C
(x), C(a)) are high, individual willingness to cooperate
evolves to zero (Figure 5.a). Individuals willingly
Figure 3 Stable and instable fix points of the model and the
position of the hysteresis point for different group sizes (n).
Results from numerical and individual-based (IBM) simulations show
the same results. Instable fix points (dashed line for numerical
simulations, open red circles for IBM simulations) separate the
interior stable fix points (thick lines for numerical and filled red
circles for IBM simulations) and 0 cooperativeness in the system. a,
Group size (n) is 5, the threshold values are (T)5 ,4 ,3 ,2 ,1 .b, the
locations of the hysteresis points (i.e. the maximal cost where
cooperation still can be a stable), with different group sizes (n). (♦: T
= n-1; ▲: T = n/2).
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high values of a, close to 1) only if there are high levels
of cooperation with regard of group hunting (i.e. the
colours of the large bubbles ranges from orange to red
(~0.7-1) on Figure 5.e-h, Figure 5.c). However, coopera-
tion in the Public Goods Game can stay at high levels
even if the propensity to participate in group defense is
low (i.e. there are small red bubbles when the cost of
group defense is high) (Figure 5.b). Polymorphism of
different cooperative efforts in the Public Goods Game
is still present at many of the equilibria (i.e. lighter
shade of red), and interestingly division of labour
evolves at medium values of costs in the well-mixed
case (Figure 5.f red/yellow bubbles). In these cases, poly-
morphism occurs on the population level, where indivi-
duals cooperate strictly in one of the collective actions,
but never both (Figure 5.d).
Our results also indicate, in line with the general con-
clusion of previous models that spatial structure favours
cooperation [6,8,19,79], as high values of cooperation
evolve for both public actions (hunting and group
d e f e n s e ,s e el a r g er e db u b b l e s )e v e na th i g hc o s tv a l u e s
(Figure 5.g and 5h). We observe division of labour in
the spatially explicit model only under given circum-
stances (see Additional file 1 for further details), which
suggests that this outcome is unstable in these cases
with small group size. Note that when C(x) > 0 coopera-
tion evolves only if the initial proportion of cooperation
is not zero in the population with well-mixed structure,
which indicates a separatrix in the system. However,
spatial population structure promotes cooperation and it
allows cooperators to invade at higher cost values with
regard of both types of costs (i.e. compare 5.e with 5.g
and 5.f with 5.h).
Discussion
Here we show that multilevel selection in threshold
PGG can maintain stable levels of polymorphism (i.e. a
stable mixture of cooperators and defectors) without the
need of punishment or spatially explicit population
structure. We give a primary demonstration that the
described dynamics holds not only for step-wise benefit
function (strict threshold function), but for a wide range
of sigmoid curves between the step-wise and the linear
benefit functions (s-shape function). Our results further
indicate that polymorphism in group hunting and
defense can be adaptive in case of multilevel selection,
and to our knowledge, we provide a pioneer report on
the division of labour in multiple Public Good Games.
We conclude that what was regarded as cheating at the
individual level is in fact can play a significant part in
the optimization at the group level, which optimization
a        b           c
d        e           f
Figure 4 Equilibrium frequency of cooperators as a function of the cost of the Public Good Game (C(x)). The panels depict the results of
the individual-based simulations for non-zero stable fix points (filled marks) and instable fix points (open marks). The groups are composed of 5
individuals either picked randomly from the population (a, b, c), or from the same site in the model with spatial population structure (d, e, f). In
cases a, d competition occurs only between groups, in the simulations of b and e, both individuals and groups compete with each other with
compulsory participation. Finally in the cases of c, f both individual and group level selection are present and participation in the group stage is
voluntary. The different marks are depicted to different threshold values (●,○: T =5 ;■,□: T =4 ;♦,◊: T =3 ;▲, Δ: T = 2).
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behavioural polymorphism.
Many of the collective actions produce goods that are
non monopolizable, meaning that no one can be
excluded from benefiting [33-35], thus free riders can
exploit this collective good without paying the cost of
production [28]. Threshold effects in Public Good
Games can provide an often neglected, yet powerful
explanation for the observed polymorphism in the popu-
lation, as an alternative to punishment [18], spatial
structure [19] or various payoff functions [16,17].
Population level polymorphism is a stable outcome in
Threshold Public Good Games, where cooperators and
free riders stably live together in the population [71,72],
as long as the cost of cooperation doesn’t exceed a limit
cost value, the hysteresis point. Our model predicts that
for an increased group size this hysteresis, that is a sud-
den drop from cooperation to defection, appears at
lower cost values, compared to smaller groups (see Fig-
ure 3.b). To put it in a different way, with large groups
cooperation can be maintained only if the cost of coop-
eration is relatively low. Also for higher cost values the
instable fix points move closer to the stable fix points,
which means that the invasion of cooperators in a popu-
lation of defectors becomes harder, while the invasion of
defectors into a cooperative population becomes more
likely.
Introducing multilevel selection into the model is a
logical step towards reality, as in many biological and
human examples where collective hunting occurs inter-
group conflicts can be also observed [35,74-77]. When
group level competition introduced explicitly into the
model population level polymorphism is stabilized both
in well-mixed and spatially explicit populations. Thus,
multilevel selection need not select for the groups with
the highest number of cooperators as it is often
assumed. Groups that optimize the number of hunters
enjoy an advantage over those groups that hunt (coop-
erate) on a higher, unnecessary level. Thus, defection of
a given proportion of individuals during one specific
cooperative group action can be an adaptive strategy for
the group depending on the cost values. Because group
level performance (i.e. success in the PGG) determines
both individual and group level success any deviation
from the optimal group composition would cause a dis-
advantage in some way or other. If the number of
e     f
g      h
Cost of cooperation, C(x)
 Cost,
C(a) 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1
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Figure 5 Simulation results for the multilevel selection model with voluntary participation. The average propensity for cooperation
concerning the two kinds of group actions, the public goods game and the voluntary group competition action as a function of the two costs
of cooperation (C(x) and C(a)) and the initial ratio of cooperators (xi) in the Public Goods Game. (a) For high cost values the tendency of
cooperating in both of group actions is low, (b) or there is a full cooperation in the Public Goods Game, but full defection in the group defense
action. (c) If the costs of cooperation are not high, every individual cooperates in both of the group actions (x = ~1, a = ~1). (d) At the
boundaries of these regions, for intermediate cost values division of labour evolves in the population (h). On graphs e.-h. each bubble illustrates
the results of an individual based simulation, the size representing the average a in the population (large bubbles represent a = 1 and vice
versa), and the colouring depicting the average value of x (red bubbles denote x = 1, while yellow ones denote x = 0). For the simulations we
either used no initial incentive in the populations for participating in the group competition (ai =0 )( e, g), or the simulation was started with full
participation (ai =1 )( f, h). The 5 group members were either picked randomly from the population in the well-mixed model (e, f), or from the
same site in the spatially explicit model (g, h). ((a) C(x) = 0.5, C(a) = 0.5, xi =0 ,ai =0 ;( b) C(x)=0 ,C(a) = 0.6, xi =0 ,ai = 0.5; (c) C(x) = 0.2, C(a)=
0.05, xi = 0.05, ai = 0.2; (d) C(x) = 0.6, C(a) = 0.2, xi = 0.6, ai = 0.5).
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collective action (i.e. hunting) is unsuccessful, thus
neither cooperators nor defectors gain anything, and
these groups are being replaced by successful groups.
On the other hand, if the number of cooperators is
higher than what is required for providing benefit for
the whole group (in our example capturing the prey),
the energy loss of unnecessary effort would cause a dis-
advantage when the group faces a conflict (fight for ter-
ritory). Hence our novel result is that laggards, who
were previously seen as exploiters of the common goods
provided by cooperators [13,14], do actually contribute
to the fitness of the group by keeping the group level
allocation at the optimum level.
Our results also verify that if participation in two dis-
tinct collective actions which produce shared benefits is
costly, such as hunting and territory defense, then selec-
tion pressure on cooperators can result division of
labour to evolve, predicting that it will evolve only for a
narrow range of cost values. Interestingly, behavioural
polymorphism first appears at the individual level, that
is all of the individuals participate in both collective
actions with intermediate probabilities. However, this
state is not stable and evolution drives the system
towards division of labour at the population level, where
individuals mostly participate only in one of the collec-
tive actions (i.e. polymorphism appears at the group
level). This result is robust in our simulations at med-
ium cost values, and turns out to be stable on the long
term. Experimental support for this context dependent
role specialization is poor yet [but see [56,80]], however
the idea that cooperators and ‘free riders’ switch roles in
different contexts is not obscure [28,35,56,81,80], as
long as there is a trade off situation between two energy
consuming group actions [81].
Our model has a simplistic assumption, that individuals
have only two heritable traits that describe their beha-
vioural decisions, this two are sufficient for maintaining
polymorphism in the population. Obviously regularly
many genes effect behaviour, which explains higher poly-
morphism, still there is evidence suggesting that some
may play disproportionally important role in behavioural
switches [82]. Accordingly, our model can provide a
potential explanation for the observed polymorphism in
lions in threshold game like situations [36,37,46] and the
presence of laggards in the population [14,83].
The importance of intra group conflict in human evo-
lution seems to gain a new currency [77,78], however
since the technology of hunting humans changed a lot in
the last 250,000 years (i.e. evolution of spear points,
bows, arrows, etc. [84,85]), it is more difficult to evaluate
whether a threshold effect existed in hominid plio-pleis-
tocene group hunting. The conception of hunting large
preys would inevitably suggest so and the fact that
hunting of medium-sized and large ungulates started
long before stone-tipped and bone-tipped weapons were
widely used strongly suggests that cooperation amongst
hunters was essential for the capture of large games [85].
If it did so, then our model applies and has the potential
to explain the observed polymorphism in humans as well.
Interesting implication of our results is that once human
societies become larger and more fluid in composition
this polymorphism was no longer necessarily adaptive
and definitely was not looked upon as desirable. This, in
turn could have triggered the evolution of cultural norms
and institutions that attempts to obtain an universally
high level of cooperation from all the members of the
society regardless of their predispositions.
Conclusions
Here we present a multilevel selection model of interde-
pendence in group living species, where cooperation is
modelled as an n-player Threshold Public Good Game
and where selection acts both at the individual and at the
group level. We have found that the population can
evolve into stable levels of cooperative polymorphism,
where cooperators and free riders -laggards- can stably
live together. Our results indicate: (i) that the described
dynamics holds for a wide range of probabilistic sigmoid
benefit functions, not only for strict deterministic step-
wise function; (ii) that multilevel selection need not select
for the highest number of cooperators within groups but
instead it may selects for polymorphism depending on
the details of the TPGG; (iii) that defectors contribute to
the group fitness as much as they help the group to
achieve the optimal amount of investment at the group
level; (iv) that division of labour might evolve with regard
of the participation in the two collective actions for med-
ium cost values of cooperation; (v) and that spatial popu-
lation structure promotes cooperation in TPGGs.
Methods
The game
T h es t r u c t u r eo ft h eg a m ei sa sf o l l o w s :i n d i v i d u a l so fa
group can engage in a cooperative activity (i.e. hunting,
resource purchase) where every individual can play two
strategies, either to cooperate with probability x or to
defect with probability 1-x. The cooperative players join
in the group effort (group size is n), and thus pay a fix
cost of cooperation (c). In contrast, defectors do not pay
the cost of the game. If the number of cooperators is
equal or above a given threshold value (T), then all of
the individuals within the group can acquire the benefit
(b) of cooperation regardless whether they cooperated
or not. This derived from the non-rival, non-excludable
features of the game [33-35], that is, no individual can
be excluded from the acquired benefit of the hunt, and
each consumer gains the same proportion without
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Page 8 of 12depleting it. However if the number of cooperators does
not reach the necessary number which is required for
the successful achievement of the group action then no
one gets the benefit, but cooperators still pay the cost.
The fitness (W) is calculated as the benefit minus the
cost of the game.
Analytical solutions
We use the method described in Bach et al. 2006 [71] to
find the stable and instable equilibria of the model.
According to the Bishop-Cannings theorem [86] strate-
gies supporting a mixed equilibrium need to have the
same fitness. Thus, at a mixed equilibrium supported by
cooperators and defectors the fitness’ of both strategies
should be the same. Let us denote the level of coopera-
tiveness in the population as x,t h e nt h ef i t n e s so fa
mutant playing strategy y can be written as follows for n
=3 ,T = 2 [see [71]]:
Wyx r x y r x x c (,) ( ( ) ) =+ − −
2 21 (1)
Where c is the cost of cooperation and r is the benefit
received by all of the individuals if the number of coopera-
tors is equal or above T.I fx is a Nash equilibrium then
the W should be independent of y (since any strategy is
either cooperator: y = 1 or defector: y =0 ,o ra n yi n
between should get the same payoff). This condition holds
only if the second part of Eq.1. equals zero [71], that is:
gx r x x c () ( ) =− − = 21 0 (2)
Accordingly there are two solutions for x [71]:
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Evolutionary stability further requires that g’(x)<0
thus x1 is an ESS solution while x2 is an instable equili-
brium. This gives the simple bifurcation diagram shown
in Figure 1. in Bach et al. 2006 [71]. The fitness of a
given strategy for any group size and for any threshold
number can be written up and the equation equivalent
to Eq.2. can be derived accordingly. The following gen-
eral formulas can be obtained:
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While analytical solution might not be possible to cal-
culate at large group sizes, numerical solutions can be
obtained. Of course, the numerical solutions of this kind
will not tell us which points are the stable and which
points are the instable [but see ref. [72]]. To check the
stability of our fixed points we used an individual based
simulation of the model (details see below). The numer-
ical results and the results of the simulations are
depicted on Figure 3.
We also substitute the strict deterministic step-wise
benefit function with a sigmoid probabilistic function.
P
e
sc n T =
+
−−
1
1
() * ( ) (5)
Where P is the probability that the public goal is
reached, which depends on the steepness of the function
(s), the number of cooperators in the group (cn) and the
threshold value (T).
Individual based simulation of the model
We model the evolutionary dynamics in a finite size
population consisting of Nall individuals (10,000 and
12,500 individuals). We set up two different scenarios in
which the population structure is modelled by the two
extremes. On the one part individuals have no fixed
partners in a well-mixed model. In every time step both
the composition of cooperating groups and competition
neighbourhoods change (n, we increase the number of
cooperators up to 50 on Figure 3.b), where partners ran-
domly chosen from the entire population, so the inter-
action environment of the individual is well-mixed. In
the case of spatially explicit model individuals occupy
the grid points of a regular lattice (N × N = Nall), with
toroidal boundary conditions, and the focal individual
has a constant interaction environment, its immediate
neighbourhood. The neighbourhood in both cases
defines both the cooperating and the competing group
for the focal individual (n), which is 4 (von Neumann
neighbourhood) group members in the spatially explicit
model. The simulations were run for a given number of
update steps with asynchronous updating. An update
step consists of a game played by the group, individual
competition, group competition if occurred (see Figure
1), and mutation.
During competition step, we use a pair-wise compari-
son update rule [6], which is the finite population analo-
gue of the replicator dynamics (called the imitate the
better, for further details see Additional file 1), in which
an individual adopts the strategy of a randomly chosen
neighbour with a probability proportional to the fitness
difference, only if this difference is greater than zero.
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WW
WW
rival focal =
−
− max min
We analyze multiple competition update scenarios
(see Additional file 1 for details).
We also model territorial group behavior, in which
case groups compete with each other for territories
(sites). Groups composed of n individuals living in the
same site. The rivals could be neighbouring groups in
the spatial population (Moore neighbourhood, that is 8
closest sites) or groups randomly chosen from the popu-
lation in the well-mixed case. Groups are compared
according to the average group payoffs, and the success-
ful group entirely replaces all members of the loser one.
We calculate the average payoff of the group (W )a s
the arithmetic average of the payoffs of all group mem-
bers, that is the participation in the group competition
is compulsory.
W
W
n
j
j
n
=
= ∑
1
The chance for each group to occupy the focal site is
given as described above in the competition rules, but
using average group payoffs.
Next we introduce voluntary participation in both of
the two group actions, and individuals have two contin-
uous, evolving traits. Besides, x that defines the propen-
sity to cooperate in the PGG, we introduce a,w h i c h
describes the individual’s propensity to participate in the
territorial group defense action. The marginal values are
also 0-1. If a is high, the individual will participate in
the group competition with high probability, whereas if
it is low or 0, it will never. As the group defense is con-
sidered as an act of cooperation here, it involves a cost
C(a) for those who participated. The average group pay-
off is now calculated as the average of the payoffs of
those group members, who participate in the group
competition. Groups then compared by their average
group payoffs according to the above described competi-
tion rules.
To ensure evolution, after the competition steps,
mutation can occur in the traits of the focal individuals
with the chance 0.01. The mutant’s trait is drawn from
a normal distribution, with the original trait value as a
mean and with a given variance (0.01). The trait can
only be between 0 and 1. After individual competition,
only the focal individual’s traits can mutate, after group
competition in all members of the focal group has a
chance for mutation to occur with the same probability.
The points on figures were calculated as the average
of the last 1 M (10
6) update steps of multiple iterated
simulation results (for Figure 4 15 and for Figure 5 3
repetitions, with insignificant variation between the
repetitions). The length of the simulation was deter-
mined by preliminary simulations, that is 1,000 M, 625
M and 312.5 M update steps for Figure 3, 4 and 5
accordingly. Graphs on Figure 5.a-d were obtained by
plotting the trait distribution of the population in every
100th update step for 25,000 steps.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Supplementary Information. The file contains
additional simulation results and their interpretation. Additional
simulations were made with different update rules, different population
structure models. Here we also show and analyze some representative
time series simulation results. Text and graph files are included.
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